Montana Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 2 Spring 1958

Article 4

January 1958

Industrial Security Clearance and Individual Freedom
Douglas P. Beighle
George C. Dalthorp
Ward A. Shanahan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Douglas P. Beighle, George C. Dalthorp, and Ward A. Shanahan, Industrial Security Clearance and
Individual Freedom, 19 Mont. L. Rev. 121 (1957).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol19/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Beighle et al.: Industrial Security Clearance and Individual Freedom

NOTES
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY CLEARANCE AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM*
Private firms under government contract produce the major share of
equipment needed by our armed forces. In order to be able to perform
these contracts the firms must have access to classified information and
material. The government has developed several different clearance systems to screen both the factories and their personnel for fitness to handle
such matter. This Note will deal with the largest of these, the Department
of Defense Industrial Security Program, which affects 22,000 plants and
over 3,000,000 personnel.' Under thig program a "fadility clearance" is
granted to a factory which is approved for defense work and "personnel
clearances" are granted to screened employees. It is with the problems of
employee screening that we shall be primarily concerned herein.
There are three security classifications into which information and
material are place--confidential, secret and top secret. The employer himself can allow an employee to have access to confidential information by satisfying himself as to the person's loyalty and trustworthiness. Clearance
for secret and top secret information must come from the armed forces
branch for which the contractor is performing the work."
The extension of the authority of the federal government into the field
of private industry and employment in order to safeguard our national
security has presented special problems. The cry has been heard that the
operation of the government security programs interferes with fundamental
*This Note is an outgrowth of the 1957 National Moot Court Competition, sponsored
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The hypothetical case
posed for argument raised the issues discussed herein. The joint authors of this
Note, and in addition Charles Willey, participated in the law school intramural
moot court competition, using the same factual situation. Thereafter, the moot
court team participated in the national competition and placed second to the University of Pennsylvania in the final round of arguments.
1

In addition to the Industrial Security Program the other programs are (a) the Federal Civilian Loyalty Program, applicable to some 2,300,000 persons in the civil
service and other governmental positions; (b) the Atomic Energy Program which
covers about 80,000 federal employees and the employees of private contractors who
have access to AEC information; (c) the Port Security Program applicable to
800,000 seamen and longshoremen and administered by the Coast Guard; (d) the
International Organizations Employees Program covering 3,000 persons who work
for the United States in the United Nations and other international organizations;
and (e) the Passport Program and the Immigration and Nationality Program of
the State Department and the Civil Air Transport Program of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.

See COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURTY, REPORT (1957).

The

commission was created persuant to Public Law 304, 84th Congress.
'For clearance up to and including secret, a check is made of the records of national
agencies such as the FBI, the military departments, the Civil Service Commission,
and the Un-American Activities Committee. For access to top secret information a
background investigation is made covering the life of the subject for facts on integrity, reputation and loyalty to the United States. See The Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 71 (Revised 1955) ; The Industrial Personnel
Security Review Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 67 (Supp. 1957).
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rights of employees guaranteed by the Constitution.' On the other hand,
it has been said that liberty and security are complementary and not opposing ideas, and that only through security may liberty for all be maintained. This Note will examine the question whether the extension of
federal power which has been made in the name of national security may
be justified, and more particularly whether a person has a protectable right
to a security clearance or to his job in a sensitive industry, what due process demands under these circumstances, and whether the present program
satisfies these due process requirements. Before entering into our discussion of these question let us see how the Industrial Security Program
operates.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
The program under discussion is contained in two basic federal regulations. One is the Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation, which
is the guide for security officers of the military departments. The other
is the Department of Defense Industrial Personnel Security Review Regulation, which sets out the criteria for judging derogatory information, the
standard for determining clearances, and the procedures to be followed
when a military department has recommended the revocation or denial of
clearance.'
When a clearance is denied, the denial is initiated by the security officer of a military department handling the contract with the person's employer. The recommendation to withhold the clearance is sent to the Director of the Office of Industrial Personnel Security Review in the Defense Department' who refers the case to a central screening board. The
screening board can grant the clearance, in which case the approved file
is sent back to the employer. The board can also deny clearance, in which
case it gives the employee a notice of suspension of clearance, a statement
of reasons for the suspension, and notice that upon request he may have a
hearing at one of the three regional hearing boards.' At the hearing, which
is not public, the employee may offer evidence, but he has no right to confront the witnesses which the government used to obtain the case against
him. The board has no subpoena power nor is there a provision to compensate and pay the expenses of witnesses for the employee. The board is not
required to follow strict rules of evidence and the decision is by majority
vote. Only one member of the hearing board need be a civilian; the chairman is a lawyer. The regulation admonishes the board to consider the fact
that the employee may be handicapped by his inability to confront or crossexamine witnesses against him, and also the fact that the sources of the

""Few persons seem to realize that in security cases the accused person does not
have the protection of the age-old presumption of innocnce." O'BRIAN, NATIONAL
SEcuRITY and INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 64-65 (1955).
'32 C.F.R. § 67 (Supp. 1957). Section 67.3-1 sets out the standard for denial of
clearance: "that access ... by the person concerned is not clearly consistent with
the interests of national security." Section 67.3-2 establishes 22 criteria which may
be used as the basis for denial of clearance.
632 C.F.R. § 67.4-2 (Supp. 1957).
'New York, Chicago, San Francisco, 32 C.F,R. § 67.4-3 (Snpp. 1957).
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government's evidence are unavailable to him. At the conclusion of the
hearing the employee is provided with a transcript of the record which
does not contain confidential reports, the names of informants or other
confidential sources of information.
After the determination in a case the board's file is forwarded to the
Director of the Office of Industrial Security Review for approval of the
record. When the record is found to be satisfactory and the decision of
the board is found to be unanimous, the Director may announce the decision
as final. This announcement will be to the person concerned and to the
military department from which the case arose. He will then order clearance to be revoked, denied or granted as set out in the board's determination. If the decision is not unanimous or the case presents unusual problems the Director will forward the case to the Review Board.!
The Central Review Board considers cases from all three regional hearing boards. Ordinarily it reviews the case from the written file only, although it may hear newly discovered evidence at its discretion. The decision is by majority vote and is final unless (a) the board wishes to reconsider the case on its own motion or at the request of the person concerned,
(b) the Secretary of Defense or the secretary of any military department
requests reconsideration, or (c) the Secretary of Defense reverses, or there
is reversal by the joint action of all three military secretaries at the request
of one of them.8
How the Program Operates
Let us illustrate the operation of the program by a hypothetical case.
Assume that John Doe is an electrical engineer. His employer's work consists entirely of classified projects making it necessary that all employees
have a security clearance. Doe received by registered mail a notice from
the Industrial Security Screening Board that his clearance had been revoked. Accompanying this letter was a statement of reasons particularizing the charges against him. The letter advised that he could have a hearing conducted in accordance with the regulations if he so desired. He requested and received a hearing before the Hearing Board. At this hearing
lie presented oral and documentary evidence refuting the charges against
him. The Department of Defense was represented at the hearing but
presented no evidence other than that contained in a secret file to which
only the Hearing Board was given access. Doe demanded to know what was
contained in the file, to know the names of adverse witnesses, and to have
the right to confront them and conduct cross-examination. These requests
were refused on the grounds of national security, the Board stating that to
grant them would reveal confidential sources of information, the disclosure
of which would be inimical to the interests of national security. The Hearing Board affirmed the decigion of the Screening Board revoking his clearance; he appealed successively to the Director of the Industrial Personnel
Security Review and to the Secretary of Defense. Both appeals were
denied.
32 C.F.R. §§ 67.4-4-7 (Supp. 1957).

832 C.F.R. § 67.4-8 (Supp. 19M7).
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When Doe received the original letter advising of the suspension of
clearance, his employer discharged him, advising him that his job would be
open if and when the clearance was restored. Doe has exhausted all of his
administrative remedies and if the adverse decision is allowed to stand it
will mean that he is barred from his former position. Can he now turn to
the courts and secure judicial review of the determination?
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
The appeal to the courts, if one does exist, would presumably be predicated on -the due process clause of the fifth amendment.! However, traditionally, in order to invoke the protection of the due process clause, one
must establish two elements: first, that he has been deprived of a legally
proteted right; and second, that this deprivation has been without due process of law."° A showing that the first element, a legally protected right, is
present has generally been held a condition precedent to raising the due
process issue.
At first glance, it would appear that Mr. Doe was deprived of a legally
protected right because he has been deprived of his job. Historically, the
courts have protected the right to work in the common occupations of the
community," but they have never been called upon to decide whether there
is a constitutional right to hold a particular employment in a particular
profession.'
It would seem that any job involving the granting of a security clearance can be distinguished from this protected "common occupation" category on two grounds: first, that denial of a particular job is not
denial of right to practice one's profession; and second, that even if it is,
any position requiring a security clearance is not one of the common occupations of the community. Furthermore, the state may, under its police
power, condition the right to engage at all in certain professions (law,
medicine, dentistry, etc.) upon the possession of qualifications reasonably
designed to establish the requisite skill or character needed for such pro-

9

"No person, shall . . .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law.. .."

u Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), ajf'd per curiam by an equally
ditided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). The Court there stated: "Due process of law
is not applicable unless one is being deprived of something to which he has a right."
Id. at 58. Cf. United States em rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539-40
(1950).
"See Davis, Requirements of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. Rsv. 193, 224 (1956).
'Typical is the following quotation from Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), at 41:
"It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."
(Emphasis added.) See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) ; Eo
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) ; The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873) ; Butcher's Union S. H. & L. S. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. &
S. H. Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884) ; Meyer! v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ; Parker v.
Lefter, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
'BResearch has revealed no cases where a particular Job in a particular profession
has been protected. Cf. Black v. Cuttei Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) ; Sperry
Gyrosope Co. v. Engineers' Assoc., 279 App. Dlv. 630, 107 N.Y.S.2d 800 (lst Dept.
1951), affd, 304 N.Y. 582, 107 N.E.2d 78 (1952).
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fessions." Though the question is still open, a fairly persuasive argument
can be made that any particular position with a government contractor contingent upon a security clearance does not fall within the scope of the common occupation cases.
It would therefore seem that if the sole consideration is the right to
work in the particular position, the challenger would probably fall short of
establishing a justiciable controversy. But the right to a particular job
is not the only right that is involved in a security clearance revocation.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a security discharge results also
in a "badge of infamy."' Is not a right of reputation also involved which
would fall within the protective scope of the fifth amendment ?" A security
discharge may render a person untrustworthy in the eyes of the world,
making it difficult to obtain comparable employment.' This incapacity to
obtain work when considered in combination with the loss of job could very
well be sufficient to satisfy the traditional requirement of a legally protectible right as a condition precedent to court review.u8

"Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). However, this is not to say that
a state may impose arbitrar.y or discriminatory standards for admission. Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) ;Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
It means simply that no one will have an absolute
right to practice medicine I)ecause the public welfare, expressed through the state
police power, may require certain qualifications. See note 25: infra.
"The Court in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), quoted Judge Learned
Hand on the effect of a security discharge, stating: "There can be no dispute about
the consequences visited upon the person excluded from public employment on
disloyalty grounds. In the view of the community the stain is a deep one; Indeed,
it has become a badge of infamy. Especially is this so in time of cold war and
hot emotions when each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy." Id.
at 190-91. See reference to the "badge of infamy" in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331,
347 (1955) ; Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 2"4 (1957).
See also
O'BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 36 (1955).
"Persons who
are dismissed on grounds of loyalty, in the words of Seth Richardson, former Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, are 'ruined everywhere and forever.'" BONTE-u. THE FEDERAL LoYALTY-SECuR=y PROGRAM 65 (1953). It is true that in the
Industrial Security Regulation is a statement to the effect that a revocation of a
security clearance in and of itself does not carry any implication that the individual
is disloyal to the United States. 20 C.F.R. at 1551, para. 67.1-3(b) (1957). Professor Huard of Georgetown Law School has remarked acidly that "unfortunatelyfew people read the Federal Register." 33 GEo. L.J. 194.
"Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Peters v. Hobby. 349 U.S. 331,
350-51 (1955), had this to say about the effect of the government security programs: "We deal here with the reputation of men and their right to workthings more precious than property itself. We have here a system where government with all its power and authority condemns a man to a suspect class and the
outer darkness without the rudiments of a fair trial. The practice of using faceless informers has apparently spread through a vast domain. It is used not only to
get rid of employees in the government but also employees who work for private
firms having contracts with the government. It has touched hundreds and ruined
many. It is an un-American practice which we should condemn. It deprives men
of liberty within the Fifth Amendment. for one of man's most precious liberties is
his right to work."
"Evidence is present that some employers "black list" any person who has had his
security clearance revoked. See Morgan, Federa7-Loyalty-Securlty Removals, 19461956, 36 NEB. L. Rav. 412, 444 (1957). Also, some employers, who do not now have
any government contracts with security requirements, still require their employees
to meet the standards set out in the Industrial Security Regulations because they
have the expectation of some day securing such a contract. See Note 8 STAN. L.
Rav. 234 (1956).
"See note 16 aupra.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1957

5

[Vol. 19,
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Montana Law Review, Vol. 19 [1957], Iss. 2, Art. 4
IS A LEGALLY PROTECTED RIGHT A SINE QUA NON TODAY?
The previous discussion has been based on the assumption that a legally
protectible right must be present to warrant the protection of due process.'
However, whether that is the test the Court is using today is a further
question. There is considerable doubt whether a legally protected right is
a sive qua non at -the present time.' The Court threw the privilege-right
dichotomy into a state of disorder with its decision in Wieman v. Updegraff.' In the Wieman case members of certain organizations were excluded from employment at a state college pursuant to a state statute. The
statute contained no requirement that the members have knowledge that
the proscribed organizations were subversive. The Supreme Court held
that this lack of a requirement of scienter violated the fourteenth amendment. Faced with its previous statement in Adler v. Board of Education,
that persons seeking employment in the New York public schools have "no
right to work for the state in the school systems on their own terms," the
Court through Mr. Justice Clark stated:
To draw from this language the facile generalization that there is
no constitutionally protected right to public employment is to obscure the issue. .

.

. We need not pause to consider whether an ab-

stract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say
that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.'
This language was followed by the Court in Slochower v. Board of Education.'A This same line of reasoning is also present in the recent Schware'

"See note 10 supra.
'For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the privilege-right dichotomy to the
present day, considering both state and federal concepts, see Davis, supra note 11.
2344 P.S. 183 (1952).
2342 U.S. 492 (1952).
'344 U.S. at 191-92. The Court clearly extended the scope of the due process clause
to an area which has historically been considered only a privilege. For example, in
M(Auliffe v. Mayor and Council of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220. 29 N.E. 517
(1992), Mr. Justice Holmes made the now famous remark: "The petitioner may
have the constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman." See also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, NR (D.C. Cir. 1950),
(iff'd ppr curiamn by an equally divided.Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) ; Dodge v. Board
of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1M.7) ; Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 5-IS (1900) ; Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890).
-350 U.S. 551 (1956). In the Slochower ease a professor at Brooklyn College was
discharged for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment. The discharge was effected without inquiring into the reasons for the
professor's action. The Supreme Court held that the discharge violated due process, stating: "To state that a persori does not have a constitutional right to Government employment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful.
and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by proper authorities." Id. at 555. This
statement prompted Professor Davis to comment that it "may be inept and illogical
or it may he clever obfuscation." Davis, supra note 3, at 277.
'In Sehware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), the Court reversed a
decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court which had sustained the Board of Bar
Examiners' refusal to admit Schware, stating (at 238-39) : "A state cannot exclude
a person from the practice of law or from nn. other occupation in a manner or for
reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Citing both Wleman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 13 (1952), and
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and Konigsberg' cases involving attorneys seeking admission to state bars.
These cases illustrate that the Court is willing to extend the area within
which it will protect from loss of employment by methods it conceives to be
arbitrary. It follows that the Court would likely also extend the "patently
arbitrary or discriminatory" test to apply to government interference with
private employees of government contractors through the revocation of security clearances.'
However, it must be conceded that recently decided
cases are not clear on this point. In 1957 the District Court of the District
of Columbia held in one decision that a discharged employee has no standing to sue and in a second declined to decide the question. In Greene v.
Wilson' the vice-president and general manager of an engineering corporation had his security clearance suspended by the Government. The employer then discharged him. Greene brought an action for 'injunction and
declaratory judgment to nullify the denial of security clearance. The district court in dismissing the case held that the plaintiff had failed to set
forth "any invasion of his legal rights ...and there is no justiciable controversy. "' The decision was based upon the right of the Government to
impose any condition it deems appropriate in its procurement contracts.'
The court in its decision ignored both the Wiernan and Slochmwer decisions
and failed to consider that the federal government is subject to constitu-

Slochower v. Board of Education, supra note 24.) The following statement also
appears: "We need not enter into a discussion of whether the practice of law is a
'right' or a 'privilege.' Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage
in this occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be
prevented from practing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is
not a matter of grace." Id. at 238 n. 5.
'In a companion case, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957),
the Court also reversed a decision by the state which, had refused admission to the
bar. In that opinion, at 262 n. 16, the Court uses the "arbitrary or discriminatory" test originally adopted in the Wieman case.
"'However, it is urged by some that the language of the Wienzct case should not be
extended into the field of security clearances. It is contended that the award or
withdrawal of a clearance is strictly a matter of executive discretion and beyond
the scope of judicial review. However, this argument loses its force when it is realized that many of the government jobs that clearly fall within the protective scope
of the holding of the Wieman case are those where the power of removal is a matter of executive discretion. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (1950), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), stated at page 65: "It is our clear opinion that the
President, absent congressional restriction. may remove from Government service
any person of whose loyalty he is not convinced. He may do so without assigning
any reason and without giving the employeed any explanatory notice. If, as a matter of policy, he chooses to give the employee a general description of the Information which concerns him and to hear what the employee has to say, he does not
thereby strip himself of any portion of his constitutional power to choose and to
remove. . . ." See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), where Chief
.Justice Taft discussed in detail the power of removal.

F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1957).
"Id. at 959-60.

2150

'rThe Court relied for the most part on Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113
(1940).
The Court in the Lukens case made this statement: "Like private individuals and businessmen, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce Its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal. and to fix the
terms and conditions upon which It will make needed purchases." Id. at 127.
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Because of this due process limita-

tion, it cannot impose upon the person contracting to provide materials
any arbitrary or discriminatory restrictions.'
Likewise, it cannot use a
contract to impose such conditions upon third parties, e.g. the contractor's
employees, because it surely cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from
doing directly. Therefore, it would seem that when contracting for defense
supplies, the Government cannot force arbitrary or discriminatory requirements of any type, security or otherwise, upon the contractor or his employee, simply by virtue of the procurement contract. It is submitted that
for these reasons the decision is erroneous in its holding that the plaintiff
established no invasion of his legal rights and failed to set out a justiciable
controversy.
The second case, Dressier v. Wilson,' involved a telephone employee
whom the company contemplated using on secret Government installations.
When his security clearance was denied by the Government he was discharged. He brought suit against the Secretary of Defense and another
government official for a declaratory judgment to the effect that the ruling
of the Department of Defense, adverse to him, was null and void, and requested a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ruling. The
district court reviewed the hearing that was afforded to Dressler and decided that the fact that he had refused to offer any evidence refuting the
charges was determinative. In dismissing, the court stated that because
of the merits of the case it was not necessary to determine whether a justiciable controversy was presented. Thus the court left open this crucial
question.
These two decisions are to be contrasted with that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Parker v. Lester." That case involved seamen who were excluded from merchant vessels because of an order which
required a security clearance for all seamen.' The court of appeals held
that the plaintiffs had been deprived of a legally protected right to their
"chosen occupation" and struck down the regulation as denying due process.' The court established justiciability through reliance on the "common

'For example, the Supreme Court in 1947 clearly acknowledged that Congress would
violate constitutional limitations if it were to discriminate among religious, political, or racial groups in the hiring or firing of employees, or entering other government contracts. The Court stated: "Appellants urge that federal employees are
protected by the Bill of Rights and that Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew, or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or
that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary
work.' None would deny such limitations on congressional power.... ".United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (dictum).
"'Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) ; Terral v. Burke
Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529, 553 (1922) ; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
See also Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 321 (1935); Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879
(1929) ; Davis, supra note 3.
'155 F. Supp. 373 (D.D.C. 1957).
"227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
t
Exec. Order No. 10173, 15 FED. Rm. 7005 (1950), Issued pursuant to the Magnuson
Act, 64 STAT. 427 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192, 194 (1952).
wThe defect was the use of confidential Informants In the hearing. This facet of the
decision will be discussed below.
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occupation" cases.87 However, the case is technically distinguishable from
the usual situation presented by the withdrawal of a security clearance in
that the denial of a clearance to the seamen was in effect a complete and
permanent proscription from occupation as seamen. In the usual case the
revocation of a clearance will not bar the person concerned from his
"chosen occupation," but only from the limited number of positions where
a security clearance is required.'
In summation, it would seem that under the "arbitrary or discriminatory" test of the Wiewan, Slochower, Schware and Konigsberg cases a
justiciable controversy is presented by the revocation of a security clearance. It is submitted that the district court erred in the Greene case, and
of course the court did not reach the question of a justiciable controversy
in the Dresslercase. One caveat should be inserted at this point. It is not
the writers' contention that the mere fact that a justiciable controversy is
presented will justify a judicial review beyond a consideration whether the
Industrial Security Review Regulation is constitutional as promulgated.
If the court sustains the regulation as written, then its consideration should
be limited in subsequent cases to a determination of whether the Screening,
Hearing, and Review Boards followed the standards set out by the regulation within the limits of the discretion given them. A discussion of why it
is necessary to so limit the scope of judicial review will be considered in
greater detail below.
CONFRONTATION OP ADVERSE WITNESSES
Assuming that there is a justiciable controversy presented, how complete a hearing for the revocation of security clearance is required under
the due process clause? This problem requires a balancing of two interests: the prevention of espionage on the one hand and the- constitutional
right of a citizen not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law on the other. To put it another way, on one side is the vitally
important interest of national security at a time when the loss of a key
scientific secret could write the obituary of American democratic government; on the other is the danger of warping and impairing our democratic
traditions of liberty and fair play-the very things we are striving to protect.'
There are many points at which the present Industrial Security Program might be challenged as not satisfying the minimum requirements of
7The decision relied heavily on Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
'The Solicitor General chose not to seek Supreme Court review of the decision, an
equivocal circumstance. See Davis, .upra note 3, at 239.
"'We must never forget that the very purpose of national security is to preserve our
independence and liberty and not merely to combat the greatest present danger to it,
Communism. The reconciliation and combination of such seemingly opposed elements as liberty and security is the mark of every successful social organization,
from the family or the small business to a great nation. It is the principal task of
government to effectuate and administer such a combination in public affairs.
AsSOCIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF

THE FEDERAL LoYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM 43 (1956) (Hereinafter referred to as the
NEw YORK REPORT) ; see also O'BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FnmDOM (1955).
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due process of law. One is the lack of subpoena power in the Hearing
Board, so that even if an individual could justify his actions he has no way
of insuring that necessary witnesses would be present at the hearing to
testify for him. Adequate notice to meet the charges is not given because
information may be omitted, the disclosure of which might be detrimental
to national security. Further, there is no right of confrontation and crossexamination of adverse witnesses. The heart of the problem is whether
the so-called '"confidential informants" should be revealed in any, or in all
cases. If there were no compelling need to protect confidential informants,
the other difficulties in granting a full and fair hearing could readily be
overcome. Therefore, we shall deal only with the question of whether
there is a place in our legal system for administrative determinations affecting vital personal interests made on the basis of information obtained
from confidential sources. It should be pointed out that the federal Adininistrative Procedure Act'" does not apply to security clearance proceedings under the present programs."
Let us examine the considerations on both sides of the question.
Factors in Favor of the Use of Confidential Inforniants
Due process is not a rule or a form of procedure that can be reduced
to a rigid formula. As Mr. Justice Holmes stated, "it is familiar that what
is due process of law depends on the circumstances. It varies with the subThe "circumstances" are
ject matter and necessities of the situation."'
these: The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in
a life or death cold war. The Russians have demonstrated amazing scientific achievements. At this stage of the nuclear-missile race, one leak of information divulging a crucial defense secret, such as the key to a successful
defensive missile, could be disastrous. The purpose of a personnel security
program is to protect these secrets by preventing security risks from obtaining access to pertinent information. The determination that a person
is a security risk is based largely on information from various informants.
It has been said that it is of vital importance to our counterespionage systems to keep the identity of these informants confidential. The issues, then,
"60 STAT.

2:37 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).

"A security clearance proceeding is not a "case of adjudication required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," within the
meaning of section 5 (60 STAT. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1952)). But even if it
were, exception (4) involving military, naval and foreign affairs functions would
probably remove these proceedings from the operation of the Act.
The APA applies only where Congress by some other statute requires an administrative hearing. Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act,
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 22, 79, 226, 360 (1946) ; Accord, American
Trucking Association v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 320, 321 (1953) : "In short,
§ 7 [required hearings] applies only when hearings were required by the statute
under which they were conducted to be made on the record and with opportunity
for oral hearing." Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1955), held that
it did not apply to clearances under the Port Security Program because the
statute in question did not specify that there should be a hearing. Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), held that the APA was applicable to a deportation case where hearing requirements have previously been read into a statute
by the Supreme Court to save it from invalidity. The Court has read no such hearing requirements into security clearance proceedings.
' 2Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909).
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involve the evaluation of the importance of the use of confidential informants and the determination whether due process requires their revelation
each time the Government feels it is necessary to deny or revoke a security
clearance.
Revelation of confidential informants would directly hamper United
States counterintelligence operations." Information from confidential
sources apparently led to the espionage conviction of Col. Rudolf Abel,
probably the most important Russian spy ever caught in this country."
The confidential informant in today's security hearing may give the tipoff
for tomorrow's espionage indictment.
Confidential informants can be roughly broken down into two classes,
the casual informant and the regular agent. While there is a much greater
justification for not revealing the secret undercover agent, it would be
harmful to the investigative agencies if even the casual informant were revealed. In a security or counterintelligence investigation, items of information are collected from many sources. When the seemingly unrelated bits
of information are evaluated, one statement by the "man next door" may
provide the key to the entire pattern. Practically all of this sort of information is furnished only on the understanding that it will be kept confidential. In order to retain the confidence of the public, the FBI and
the other investigative agencies would be required to obtain the consent
of any informants whose testimony was to be revealed. It is a fact of human experience that a great many persons would refuse to divulge information concerning a neighbor or an associate if either their statements were
revealed or they were required to testify in an open hearing.
Another reason for protecting confidential informants is that fear of
reprisal may prevent them from giving information if their names are revealed. In criminal trials it is often impossible to get testimony because
of witnesses' fears for the safety of themselxes and their families. Ordinary hoodlums are willing to threaten and injure informants to avoid or
prevent damaging testimony, the acid blinding of Victor Reisel being a case
in point." The Communists, whose declared objective is domination of the
world, would hardly be restrained by moral compunctions from intimidating probable informants if it were necessary to prevent exposure of their
activities.
Experience has indicated that when the identity of informants is revealed they stop giving information. The Judith Coplon trial represents
the only occasion on which the Government revealed an entire investigative
file. Within days a series of informants advised the FBI that in view of
this breach of confidence they could not provide information in the future."
"Hoover, Confidential Nature of FBI Reports, 8

SYlRAcusE L. REv. 2 (1956) ; Krasilovsky, Evaluating the Rolc of the Informer: The Value of Secret Information, 40

A.B.A.J. 603 (1954).
"See N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1957, § 1, p. 14.
"Hoover, supra note 43.
"Mr. Justice Clark points out that -innarcotics cases, "Once an informant is known
the drug traffickers are quick to retaliate. Dead men tell no tales. The old penalty
of tongue removal . . .has been found obsolete." Rovario v. United States, 353
U.S. 62, 67 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
"MHoover, supra note 43, at 9.
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The New York Report also recognizes that casual informants might not
give information if confrontation were required, and that the usefulness of
carefully established undercover agents would be totally destroyed." It is
also interesting to note that neither Great Britain nor Canada has provision
for confrontation in their security programs.'
There is little question of the necessity for not revealing the professional undercover agent even if it does mean the loss of a job and the other
consequences to a particular individual resulting from a security discharge.
"The Communists would gladly sacrifice some of their own number to unmask undercover agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.'"' Further, the revelation of such informants might require the establishment of
a still stronger system of personnel security. In the words of the New York
Report: "If we were to insist upon confrontation to the injury of counterespionage, a personnel security system much broader in scope and much
more stringent and more difficult of application would almost surely be
necessary.' ':' Research has uncovered no case suggesting that a sovereign

government must lay bare its intelligence information concerning a potential enemy. Why should the United States government be required to
divulge the counterintelligence network through which it combats espionage
by detecting enemy agents and preventing security leaks?
If the government were forced to reveal any of its confidential informants, either casual or undercover, it would be forced to choose between
accepting the resulting damage to its counterintelligence systems, or allowing an individual it considers to be a security risk to continue to have access
to security information.' Either is perhaps too great a price to pay. Thus,
the use of confidential informants in a security clearance proceeding can
be justified as being required by national security.
A slightly different approach is to argue that an award of a security
clearance is so inextricably linked to the preservation of the counterintelligence systems that it must by its very nature be a matter of executive discretion. Whether to award or deny a security clearance is not a question
of fact which can be determined absolutely; rather, it requires a present
judgment of what an individual's future action might be. A situation
somewhat analogous to the award of a security clearance is the power of
the executive to deny an Army commission to a physician draftee who refuses to say whether he is a Communist.' The Court's holding on that ques"NEW Yo x RSojOT 176.
19Ibid.
'Id. at 177.
"Id. at 178.
""If FBI reports are disclosed in administrative or judicial proceedings, it may be
that valuable underground sources will dry up. But that is not the choice. If the
aim is to protect the underground of informers, the FBI report need not be used.
If it is used, then fairness requires that the names of the accusers be disclosed."
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 14 (1953) (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas). In making this choice the government would necessarily weigh the importance of the informant against the sensitivity of the position. Therefore, following Mr. Justice Douglas' reasoning, the more sensitive the position, the greater the
need to reveal the informant. Conversely, the greater the importance of the informant, the more likelihood that the choice would be to leave the security risk on
the job.
"Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 99 (1953).
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tion was based on the proposition that a commission is discretionary because
grounded on a trust which can only be extended on the basis of faith in a
man's patriotism, fidelity, loyalty and trustworthiness. A security clearance is granted on the basis of faith in similar qualities, and must also be
discretionary.
Thus it can be argued that the determination of whether confidential
informants can be revealed without damage to the security of the nation
must be left in the hands of the executive. In justifying the use of confidential information in an overseas airline licensing case the Supreme
Court stated:
Tlhe President. .. has available intelligence services whose reports
are not and ought not be published to the world. It would be intolerable that the courts, without relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on inforM
mation properly held secret."
But this is not to say that the executive should be allowed absolute and
unreviewable discretion no matter how arbitrary or discriminatory its actions are. The scope of judicial review will be commented on below.
Legal Precedent for Use of Confidential Informants
A limitation on individual interests, which ordinarily might be arbitrary, becomes acceptable to due process if the limitation has a reasonable
relationship to the protection of a national interest against an apprehended
danger. For example, Civil Service employees were denied the right to
political activity by the Hatch Act. Under most circumstances this would
be a direct infringement of a first amendment freedom, yet the Supreme
Court upheld the denial because it had a reasonable relationship to the protection against the apprehended danger of inefficiency in government service caused by civil servants' political activity.' The apprehended danger
to our security system is probably even more potent. In fact, the Court
recently declared that national security was an "overriding necessity."
Due process is violated only when the right infringed is a "principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. '"" It follows that procedures which have been
found acceptable to the scheme of justice in the past should not now be
struck down as violations of due process without careful consideration. Information from confidential sources has been made the basis of decisions
affecting individual rights or interests in several other areas of the law.
For example, the Attorney General was held to have acted within the limits
of his discretion in denying bail to a resident alien, pending deportation
action, where in a habeas corpus hearing challenging his decision the government affidavit stated that confidential information indicated that the
Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 1063, 111 (1948).
"United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102, 103 (1947), restated in Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 405 (1950).
"Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 547 (1956).
'Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
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alien had previously been a Community An alien who had lived in the
United States for twenty-five years visited a short time behind the Iron
Curtain. He was denied re-entry into the United States on the basis of confidential information, the disclosure of which "may be prejudicial to the
public interest."' A war bride was excluded from the United States without a hearing on the basis of confidential information. ' The Attorney General's discretion in using undisclosed confidential information as a basis for
refusing to suspend deportation of an alien has been upheld."
A conscientious objector being tried for failure to submit to induction
was not denied due process of law when he was not permitted to see the FBI
reports or to know the names of the persons who supplied the information
that was contained in them. ' It has been held that due process does not require confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses in dismissals of govA tariff determination on the basis of confidential
ernment employees.'
information has been upheld. ' No quasi-judicial hearing is necessary in
determining whether a previously granted probation should be revoked. '
Due process is not violated when a judge in a murder trial, after a jury
verdict of guilty, with recommendation of life imprisonment, imposes the
death sentence after considering the information supplied by confidential
informants who were not confronted or cross-examined by the accused."
In several of the above decisions the Court was sharply divided and
the use of confidential informants was the subject of a number of vigorous
dissenting opinions. ' It is true that most of the decisions involved such individuals as aliens and convicted criminals. But it is also true that in many

5' Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
" 'Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
wU.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
6
Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
'
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953). "[T]he statutory scheme for review
.. entitles them to no guarantee that the FBI reports must be produced for their
inspection. We think the Department of Justice satisfies its duties under § 6 (j)
when it accords a fair opportunity to the registrant to speak his piece before an
impartial hearing officer; when it permits him to produce all relevant evidence in
his own behalf and at the time supplies him with a fair resume of any adverse
evidence in the investigator's report." Id. at 5, 6; cf. Simmons v. United States,
348 U.S. 397 (1955) ; Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955) ; Imboden v.
United States, 194 F.2d 508 (6 Cir. 1952). United States v. Jacobson, 154 F. Supp.
103 (W.D. Wash. 1957), extended the doctrine of the Jencks case (discussed below)
to a prosecution of a conscientious objector for failure to submit to induction. The
court held that the defendant was entitled to examine the original FBI reports and
not just a resum of them. The court also expressed the belief that the Nugent
case would be decided differently if it were before the present Supreme Court. In
a directly conflicting decision, the Fourth Circuit refused to apply the Jenck8 doctrine to a conscientious objector case. Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615 (4th
Cir. 1957).
6
3Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divi4ed Court, 341 U.S. 198 (1951).
"Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
6'
Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
"Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
"TFor example, in Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), the Court divided 5 to 4. Justice Reed wrote the majority opinion, joined by Burton, Clark, Minton and Harlan.
Warren, Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissented, each in a separate opinion.
Two of the majority, Reed and Minton, have since been replaced by Justices Brennan and Whittaker.
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there was a greater personal interest at stake and a far less significant national interest than in a security clearance proceeding.
Factors Against the Use of Confidential Informants
Perhaps the best illustration of what can happen when reports from
confidential informants are the basis for the decision in a security clearance proceeding is the case of John Jones, a real case with a fictitious name.:
[A] co-worker informed the FBI that he had heard Jones express Communist ideas to another employee, and that Jones had
told the informant that he was going to join a subversive organization.
At the hearing, on direct examination by members of the Security Hearing Board, it appeared that the . . . informant had

never been displeased by anything that Jones had done in their
work together, and was simply doing his duty as a loyal citizen.
On cross-examination, however, the informant admitted that
he could not recall the nature of the pro-Communist ideas expressed by Jones, except that he was positive that they were proCommunist; that he did not know what Communism was, "except that it is a form of political party which threatens world
supremacy and so on and so forth. .... "

The informant further testified that the subversive organization Jones had told him he was going to join was Americans for
Democratic Action, and that an attorney-friend of the informant
had told him that Americans for Democratic Action was "as Communist as Russia itself." Towards the close of the cross-examination, (after it had been developed that the informant had at one
time been Jones' supervisor and that thereafter Jones had advanced rapidly in grade, becoming the informant's supervisor),
the informant admitted that on several occasions Jones had taken
credit for the informant's work.'
One wonders what Jones' chances would have been if he had been denied
the right of cross-examination.
It cannot be denied that the lack of the opportunity to confront adverse
witnesses in an administrative proceeding is not in accordance with the
usual concept of a fair hearing. Cross-examination has been termed the
greatest legal engine for the discovery of truth ever invented.' It is doubtful whether the handicap to the charged employee is entirely cured by the
regulation directing the Hearing Board to "take into consideration the
fact that the person may have been handicapped in his defense by the nondisclosure to him of classified information or by his lack of opportunity
to identify or cross-examine persons constituting sources of information.""
"Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae, p. 14-15, Peters v.
Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), also set out in Davis, supra note 11, at 213-214. See
also a similar account by Judge Pope in Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 720 n. 19
(9th Cir. 1955), as to the suspension as a security risk of Abraham Chasanow, a
civilian employee of the Navy, and the examples cited in hearings before the Senate
Sub-committee on Government Employees Security Program reported in United
States News and World Report, Sept. 9, 1955, p. 128.
15 WIGmOR, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
-32 C.F.R. § 67.4-6 (b) (Supp. 1957).
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Mr. Justice Douglas, in a case involving the loyalty discharge of a government employee on the basis of confidential information, lucidly expressed
the liberal view as follows.
Dr. Peters was condemned by faceless informers, some of whom
were not known even to the Board that condemned him. Some of
these informers were not even under oath. None of them had to
submit to cross-examination. None had to face Dr. Peters. So far
as we or the Board know, they may be psychopaths or venal people,
like Titus Oates, who revel in being informers. They may bear
old grudges. Under cross-examination their stories might disappear like bubbles. Their whispered confidences might turn out to
be yarns conceived by twisted minds or by people who, though
sincere, have poor faculties of observation and memory."
While it might be possible to justify the denial of confrontation in
cases where the most sensitive of security information is involved, there is
a grave danger of doing so in programs involving three million persons,
and which are likely to extend indefinitely. Such an inroad into the individual freedoms is a large foot in the door for continued and expanding
curtailments of these freedoms. It would have the effect of dulling the
senses of people and of laying the groundwork for further encroachments.
The end result could well be the alteration of the American system into one
similar to that of the Communist foe. Mr. Justice Douglas expressed this
idea as follows:
In days of great tension where feeling runs high, it is a temptation
to take shortcuts by borrowing from the totalitarian techniques of
our opponents. But when we do, we set in motion a subversive
influence of our own design, that destroys us from within ... '
Thus, particularly in the less sensitive areas, the maximum amount of
confrontation consistent with security should be afforded. This is also in
the best interests of the Government. If inaccurate information from an
informant causes a competent scientist to unjustly lose a clearance, the
whole country suffers the loss.
Caurt Decisions on the Use of Confidential Informants in
Security Clearance Proceedings
The question of the use of confidential informants in security clearance proceedings has been before the courts frequently during the past few
years. The question remains unsettled. In the 1950 decision of Bailey v.
Richardson,' the plaintiff was discharged from a federal government position due to reasonable doubt about her loyalty. Although she was neither
given a chance to know the nature of nor to meet the evidence against her,
her discharge was upheld.- However, the court of appeals did not meet the
question here under consideration because the decision was based on the
"1Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 350-351 (1955) (concurring opinion).
'Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 176 (1951)
curring opinion).

(con-

11182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), ajf'd per curiazm by an equally div'ided Court, 341 U.S.
198 (1951).
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proposition that there is no constitutionally protected right to government
employment.
Five years later the Court granted certiorari in Peters v. Hobby' with
the express purpose of settling -the question. That case also involved a
loyalty discharge of a government employee. The Court decided that the
discharge was invalid, but sidestepped the main issue and decided on the
technical ground that the action of the Central Loyalty Review Board in
re-considering Dr. Peters' clearance on its own initiative was erroneous.
Cole v. Young' considered the power of the Government to extend to
the heads of non-sensitive agencies the power of summary suspension and
unreviewable dismissal over their civilian employees, when deemed necessary in the "interests of national security." The Court held against such
extension saying:
[I]t is difficult to justify summary suspensions and unreviewable
dismissal on loyalty grounds of employees who are not in "sensitive" positions and who are thus not situated where they could
bring about any discernible adverse effects on the Nation's security . . . in view of the stigma attached to persons dismissed on
loyalty grounds, the need for procedural safeguards seems even
greater than in other cases, and we will not lightly assume that
Congress intended to take away those safeguards in the absence
of some overriding necessity, such as exists in the case of employees
handling defense secrets."
This language indicates that the Court might approve the lack of
"procedural safeguards," including the lack of confrontation of adverse
witnesses, in cases of loyalty discharges of government employees in sensitive areas. It is not a long step from denying confrontation in discharges
of government employees to denying confrontation in revoking a clearance necessary for a job in private employment. Further substantiating
this position is the statement by the Court that "the greater the sensitivity
of the position, the smaller may be the doubts that would justify termination. ' ,
Uncertainty as to how the Supreme Court would rule has resulted in
considerable difficulty and conflict in the lower federal courts. The Ninth
Circuit, in Parker v. Lester," held that the Coast Guard's Port Security
Program violated the due process clause because merchant seamen must
have fair and reasonable notice of adverse information used in making a
security determination. That program did not allow confrontation and
cross-examination of adverse witnesses. Judge Pope in considering the
hearing afforded under the Port Security Program said:
Is this system of secret informers, whisperers and talebearers of
such vital importance to the public welfare that it must be preserved at the cost of denying to the citizen even a modicum of the
protection traditionally associated with due process?'
-.349 U.S. 331 (1955).
-351 U.S. 536 (1956).
"Id. at 546.
'Id. at 554.
1227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
"Id. at 719.
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Obviously Judge Pope would have nothing to do with the use of confidential informants.
As stated above, in Greene v. Wilson the District Court for the District of Columbia held that an employee of a defense contractor, dismissed
because his security clearance was revoked under the Industrial Security
Program, was deprived of no legal rights giving rise to a justiciable controversy.' However, the same court in the subsequent case of Dressler v.
Wilson,' also involving a dismissal from private employment after a clearance was revoked, stated that "there is no constitutional requirement of
confrontation with witnesses in a proceeding outside of the criminal
courts. "
No discussion of the use of confidential informants would be complete
without mention of the Jeneks case.' The holding there was simply that
an accused has a right to examine, for the purposes of impeachment, reports previously made to the FBI by witnesses presently testifying in a
criminal trial. It should have no bearing on the question of the use of confidential informants in a security clearance proceeding because (1) the
Jencks case involved no confidential informants (the informants were on
the witness stand) and (2) it was a criminal trial. In a criminal trial an
accused has all of the protections afforded under the sixth amendment.
It would be foolhardy to apply the same rules to a security case. Imagine
the situation if in order to revoke a top secret clearance the Government
had to prove to twelve jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that the retention
of a clearance by the charged individual would not be clearly consistent
with national security."
However, the Jencks case has already resulted in the reversal of Smith
Act convictions which had previously been affirmed by courts of appeals."
The Jencks case may have an even greater effect as a result of extensions
made by lower courts from its narrow holding. Congress, apparently fearing such extensions, reacted quickly in passing a statute construing the
case solely in terms of a "criminal prosecution," thereby attempting to
limit its application.' However, in a recent case from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia' the doctrine of the Jencks case was extended to administrative proceedings and the above statute was cited without any indication from the court that perhaps the spirit of the statute was
being violated. That case involved a proceeding before the Subversive
Activities Control Board to determine whether the Communist Party was
a Communist-action organization. The court directed the Board to permit the Communist Party's attorneys to examine two reports previously
'Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Engineer's Association, 304 N.Y. 582, 107 N.E.2d 78 (1951),
held that a project engineer on a guided missile project had no cause of action after
being summarily dismissed from his employment as a result of the revocation of
his security clearance.
"155 F. Supp. 373 (D.D.C. 1957).

"Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 670 (1957).

""The standard

for revoking or denying a clearance under the Industrial Security
Program is whether "on the basis of all the available information, that access to
classified information by the person concerned is not clearly consistent with the
interest of national security." 32 C.F.R. § 67.3-1 (Supp. 1957).
"Scales v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 9 (1957) ; United States v. Lightfoot, 76 Sup.
Ct. 10 (1957).
71 STAT. 595, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957).
"Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 26 U.AL.
Week 2332 (D.C. Cir. Jan, 9, 1958).
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made for the FBI by one of the Government's witnesses before the Board.
The doctrine has also been extended to a civil trial revoking a certification
of citizenship on the ground of fraud' and to the prosecution of a conscientious objector for failure to submit to induction.' The latter decision
is almost directly contrary to the 1953 Supreme Court case of United States
v. Nugent.'
CONCLUSION
The authors feel that some modification of the Industrial Security Program is in order. Confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses by the charged employee should be granted in all cases where it
would not be detrimental to the counterintelligence functions. The crux of
the problem is who should decide which informants should be revealed and
what review is to be afforded this decision. We feel that the executive department should continue to determine which informants may be revealed.
But it should also be required to actually consider the circumstances of each
case to see if a particular informant should be required to testify. There
should be no blanket determination that no informant shall testify. In
other words, the executive should determine in its discretion which informants will be revealed, but the courts should have the power to determine whether discretion is actually being exercised. Further, the courts
should be able to review the basic regulations to determine whether they
are arbitrary or discriminatory.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to make more specific recommendations, but two monumental studies have been made in this general field
which contain detailed recommendations for changes in the security programs. They are the Report of the Comission on Government Security
and the Report of the Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security
Program of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. It is submitted that Congress and the Executive should give serious consideration
to the conclusions contained in them in any attempt to modify the security
programs.
In light of the recent liberal opinions of the United States Supreme
Court we feel that the conclusion of the American Bar Association's Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives is pertinent to the
problem of this paper:
We strive to find the proper degree of balance between liberty and
authority. It is traditional and right that our courts are zealous
in protecting individual rights. It is equally necessary that the
executive and legislative branches take effective action to gird our
country in defense against Communist infiltration and aggression.
If the courts lean too far backward in the maintenance of theoretical rights, it may be that we have tied the hands of our country and have rendered it incapable of carrying out the first law of
mankind-the right of self preservation. '
DOUGLAS P. BEIGHLE
GEORGE C. DALTHORP
WARD A. SHANAHAN
6United States v. Matles, 154 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
'8United States v. Jacobson, 154 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Wash. 1957).
346 U.S. 1 (1953).
90U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 16, 1957, p. 139.
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